

The Economics and Politics of Monetary Regionalism in Asia

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This article discusses the political economy context surrounding the Japanese proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund and highlights other recent initiatives towards enhanced monetary regionalism. The discussion reveals the keenness that the region has shown towards intensified co-operation in these areas. Nevertheless, the economic/political economy rationale for such co-operation does not appear to have been fully articulated, a void that this article attempts to fill. Insofar as "regional contagion" is seen as providing the analytical basis for monetary regionalism, a large part of the discussion is devoted to defining and highlighting the various transmission channels through which currency and financial crises may spread contagiously, and drawing out policy implications thereof.

I. Introduction

In the interest of sharpening the issues, but cognizant that this may be an overgeneralization, we observe that to critics of the Japanese development model, Japan transferred the worst features of corporate governance to the rest of East Asia. The financial crisis was viewed by them as stark evidence of the unsustainability of the Japanese development model (Hughes 2000; Reich 2000; and Rhodes and Higgott 2000). The IMF conditionality imposed on crisis-hit East Asian economies was correspondingly considered imperative in bringing about a "convergence" of the region's development strategies to the Anglo-American model, which in turn was thought to be a prerequisite for sustained robust growth in the future.

Not surprisingly, the Japanese and many others

in East Asia have viewed things quite differently. The essence of their argument has been that the IMF conditionality, which was "structural" in nature, was overly intrusive and unwarranted in view of what they considered as being a "liquidity" crisis attributable to a financial market panic and macro policy errors such as the maintenance of the U.S. dollar peg (Ito et al. 1998). Accordingly, in an effort to sustain the East Asian development model and remain supportive of the countries that adopted it, the Japanese Government first proposed an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in September 1997 in Bangkok, Thailand.¹

The original aim of the AMF was to make available a pool of funds to be quickly disbursed as a means of emergency balance of payments support for the crisis-hit economies. The proposal was enthusiastically welcomed by many regional

economies that were eager to see Japan taking on a bigger leadership role in the region (in the economics and financial spheres) and promote closer monetary co-operation. In addition, there was an anticipation by some that the conditionality attached with the AMF would not be nearly as strict as those required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While the bulk of financing of the AMF would have been from Japan, it reportedly received pledges of contributions from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. The potential mobilization capacity of an AMF was estimated to have been in the order of about US\$100 billion (ADB 1999).

The IMF was, however, unreceptive to the proposal. Stanley Fischer, Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, warned that Japan's AMF proposal was in essence "a threat to the authority and effectiveness of the IMF itself".² The U.S. administration was even more vehemently opposed to the idea, perceiving it as an attempt to challenge its regional hegemony.³ A counter-proposal, which included a U.S. component was hastily prepared and announced (a US\$10 billion US-Japan initiative), though never acted upon (Montagnon and McNulty 1998). In the end, as Wade and Veneroso (1998, p. 19) noted, "(t)he United States Treasury pulled out all the stops to kill the proposal, and it died". The U.S. administration's reaction to the AMF proposal was in sharp contrast to its policy response to Mexico during the peso crisis of 1994-95, in which the Treasury tried to "strong-arm" the IMF, Europe, and Japan into contributing to the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) (Altbach 1997). Bergsten (1998) has reminded us that China's opposition to the AMF proposal was also instrumental in its failure to get off the ground.⁴

While the AMF proposal has entered policy debates intermittently since it was first mooted, it made headlines in 1999 when the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, tabled it again at an Asian Summit organized by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Singapore. He reportedly stated that the AMF should be:

a small compact wholly regional funding

organization which would be deeply and constantly engaged in East Asian monetary co-operation and problems on a daily basis.⁵

ASEAN ministers mooted a version of the AMF proposal in their "informal" summit in Manila in 1999; the Philippines President, Joseph Estrada, made specific reference to the AMF proposal in his opening remarks to the summit.⁶ A report linked to the Japanese Prime Minister's office concluded that:

(i) if the IMF can be likened to a major hospital caring for the world as a whole, then we should consider supplementing it with the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund to serve as a "family physician" to provide care at a more intimate level.⁷

Having briefly noted the political economy context surrounding the initial AMF proposal and its rejection, the next section highlights recent initiatives towards enhanced monetary regionalism. The discussion reveals the keenness that the region has shown towards intensified co-operation in these areas. Nevertheless, the economic/political economy rationale for such co-operation does not appear to have been fully articulated, a void that Section III attempts to fill.⁸ Insofar as "regional contagion" is seen as providing the analytical basis for monetary regionalism, Section IV is devoted to defining and highlighting the various transmission channels through which currency and financial crises may spread contagiously and drawing out policy implications thereof. The final section offers a few concluding remarks.

II. Recent Developments in Monetary Regionalism in Asia

While recent financial crises have spurred a revival in Asian regionalism as a means of complementing multilateralism (The Economist 2000; Katzenstein et al. 2000), the Asia-Pacific region in fact already has an existing co-operative scheme in place in the form of the EMEAP or the Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks.⁹

1. *The Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP)*

The EMEAP is a co-operative organization comprising central banks and monetary authorities of eleven economies: Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Its primary objective is to strengthen the co-operative relationship among its members. The EMEAP's activities broadly encompass three levels: (a) annual meetings of the EMEAP governors; (b) semi-annual ones involving the deputy governor; and (c) three Working Groups on Banking Supervision, Financial Markets and Payments and Settlement Systems. Specifically, while the deputy governors have been meeting regularly since 1991, the governors started doing so only since 1996, there having been four meetings since then: the first and third in Tokyo (19 July 1996 and 14 July 1998), the second in Shanghai (25 July 1997), and the fourth in Hong Kong (9 July 1999). Each one of these meetings has had a broad theme: the first was on the means of strengthening central bank co-operation to enhance financial stability and market development in the region; the second was on asset prices and (their) impact on monetary policy; the third on the relationship between international investment and financial stability; and the fourth on the international financial architecture.

It was only after the governors initiated their regular meetings in 1996 that the EMEAP became fairly active (and certainly took on a higher profile), with the establishment of the various Working Groups noted above. In addition to the Working Groups, following the Tequila crisis, EMEAP took substantive steps towards monetary co-operation. For instance, a number of member economies signed a series of bilateral repurchase (repo) agreements in 1995 and 1996. Hong Kong and Singapore also reached an agreement to intervene in foreign currency markets on behalf of the Bank of Japan (Moreno 1997). These creditor regional economies also attempted to help defend the Thai baht for some period before the Bank of Thailand succumbed to the speculative pressures

in mid-1997. EMEAP appears to have become fairly dormant since then.

2. *Recent Developments*

Although the initial AMF proposal has been a non-starter (primarily because of the timing and manner of the initial announcements), Japanese policy-makers have maintained strong interest in moving forward monetary regionalism in Asia in some form or the other. Among the ASEAN countries, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand have remained most sympathetic to and supportive of the AMF proposal. Even after the objection from the United States and IMF, these countries together with Japan continued to explore regional options.

Of course, the bailout packages in Asia have, by and large, been regional in any event. To be sure, half of the total US\$42 billion financial assistance committed to Indonesia through the IMF was bilateral aid, most of which was by regional economies in the Asia-Pacific region. In the case of commitments to Thailand, over one-fifth of the US\$47 billion package was bilateral, all of which was from the regional economies. The United States contributed US\$5 billion to South Korea, US\$3 billion to Indonesia and none to Thailand (Table 1). Additionally, the Asian economies such as Japan provided other forms of bilateral assistance to the crisis-hit regional economies through the New Miyazawa and related initiatives detailed in Chang and Rajan (1999). Nonetheless, these have been *ad hoc* measures as opposed to systematic efforts at promoting monetary regionalism. Two important systematic co-operative initiatives in this regard are the Manila Framework and the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI).

Manila Framework. The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum agreed to establish a Manila Framework for Enhanced Asian Regional Co-operation to Promote Financial Stability at the fifth APEC Summit in Vancouver in November 1997. The Framework included the following initiatives: (a) a co-operative financing arrangement that would supplement IMF

TABLE 1
IMF-led International Financial Assistance *Committed to*
Thailand, Indonesia and Mexico
(In US\$ billions)

<i>Country and Source of Assistance</i>	<i>Amount (\$ billions)</i>
Indonesia:	
IMF(International Monetary Fund)	11.2
World Bank	5.5
ADB (Asian Development Bank)	4.5
Countries	21.1
USA	3.0
Japan	5.0
Australia	1.0
China, P.R.C.	1.0
Hong Kong	1.0
Malaysia	1.0
Singapore	5.0
Others	4.1
Total	42.3
IMF <i>disbursements</i> as of 17 January 1999	8.8
Thailand:	
IMF	34.0
World Bank	1.5
ADB	1.2
Countries	10.5
Japan	4.0
Australia	1.0
Brunei	0.5
China, P.R.C.	1.0
Hong Kong	1.0
Indonesia	0.5
Korea	0.5
Malaysia	1.0
Singapore	1.0
Total	47.2
IMF <i>disbursements</i> as of 17 January 1999	3.1
Mexico (1994-95):	
IMF	17.8
World Bank and Inter-American Bank	2.8
BIS (Bank for International Settlements)/G10	10.0
USA	20.0
Total	50.6

SOURCE: Chang and Rajan (1999).

resources; (b) enhanced economic and technical co-operation, particularly in strengthening domestic financial systems and regulatory capacities; and (c) a mechanism for regional surveillance to complement the IMF's global surveillance.¹⁰ The bilateral financing packages for the crisis-hit economies were arranged in the Manila Framework as a second line of defence. Nevertheless, the framework is highly limited as it has "no formal status, secretariat or other institutional foundation...(S)upplementary funding has not been implemented on a permanent and assured basis" (Wang 2000, p. 208). As such, at a practical level, the Manila Framework appears to be basically a high level regional forum which allows a candid sharing of views and opinions in regional and financial matters and concerns.

Chiang Mai Initiative. Arguably, of more significance is the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). This initiative came under serious discussion at the sidelines of the thirty-third Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), where it was agreed that selected East Asian economies would create a network of bilateral currency swaps and repurchase agreements as a "firewall" against future financial crises (Bello 2000). The CMI is aimed at providing countries under pressure with short-term hard currency liquidity to bolster reserves through bilateral swaps (Wheatley 2000).¹¹ The CMI extends and expands upon the little known ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) to encompass all ASEAN countries as well as China, Japan, and Korea (i.e. ASEAN Plus Three or APT).

The ASA was established in the 1970s to provide short-term swap facilities to members facing temporary liquidity or balance of payments problems. In 1977, there were only five ASEAN signatories — Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand — each contributing about US\$40 million and able to withdraw twice its contribution. This facility was increased to US\$200 million in 1978. At the fourth ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting in Brunei Darussalam (24–25 March 2000), the Ministers agreed to expand the ASA to include the remaining ASEAN

members, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam. At the time of writing, the ASA had reached US\$1 billion. The ASA is to be made available for two years and is renewable upon mutual agreement of the members.¹²

This buttressing of the ASA is the first step in a three-step process towards the creation of the CMI. The three ASEAN dialogue partners (China, Japan, and Korea) are simultaneously in discussions to establish bilateral swap arrangement among themselves. This will be followed by the setting up of fifteen bilateral pacts between the APT economies (Wheatley 2000). Details remain to be worked out.

Despite some scepticism,¹³ the creation of the CMI has been viewed as historic; insofar as it is an important first step towards the creation of a full-fledged monetary facility. In his op-ed piece entitled "Asian Monetary Fund Reborn", Goad (2000, p. 54) noted that the CMI "does give Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia a structure and an excuse to keep talking about pan regional economic issues in concrete terms". The CMI appears to have been well received, even by the IMF and the U.S. administration (Startfor 2000; Taniguchi 2000). At a press conference by Horst Kohler in Prague (20 September 2000), the new IMF Managing Director expressed support for the AMF and other regional initiatives as long as they are complementary and not competitive with the IMF approach.¹⁴ China too has expressed open support for and an intention to actively participate in the CMI (Goad 2000; Rowley 2000).

III. Rationale for Monetary Regionalism

While monetary regionalism in East Asia has taken important steps forward, its rationale has not always been made clear. What exactly is the underlying economic rationale for such a self-standing regional monetary facility? Certainly, the answer depends on the precise form of regionalism, which varies across the specific proposals. However, at a general level, and beyond the obvious and important benefits of closer economic dialogue, there are two main reasons for

monetary regionalism in Asia which we discuss in some length below.

1. Regionalism as a Complement and Supplement to Multilateralism

The United States has provided the necessary economic and financial leadership in the Americas and is seen as the region's *de facto* regional lender of last resort; while monetary integration has been successfully attained in Europe with a centralized financial and monetary institution (i.e. the European Central Bank). Asia, in contrast, possesses neither a strong regional hegemon nor a regional monetary institution. The financial crisis of 1997–98 has made it appear disjointed and unable to respond in an effective and co-ordinated manner. This may provide a case for establishing some sort of geographically concentrated facility which allows the regional economies in Asia to work in concert to gain a larger voice in international monetary affairs, as has been quite successfully achieved in the case of global trade. This point may be of particular relevance to the smaller open economies in Asia. For instance, apart from the three Asian giants of China, India, and Indonesia, no other emerging economy in the region has been included in the G-20 Finance Ministers forum recently formed to look into issues regarding the shaping of the international financial architecture, as they were considered to be “systematically unimportant countries” (Rowley 1999).¹⁵

It is sometimes charged that the IMF's decision to bail out economies in trouble, the speed with which it does so (actual disbursement of aid rather than initial negotiations), and the type and degree of austerity of the conditionality imposed, are largely political, based on the strategic/security objectives of the most important member, the United States, which holds a disproportionate influence over the institution (and has a *de facto* veto power) (Bird and Rowlands 1999; Pieper and Taylor 1998). Thaker (1999) has in fact provided important empirical support for the propositions that the political interests of the U.S. influence IMF behaviour. In this light, an argument may be

made that the countries in the Americas (Mexico, Brazil, etc.) and “strategically significant” extra-regional countries, such as Russia, will always be given “preference” over other small emerging economies in Asia, for instance.¹⁶

Even abstracting from these “strategic” issues, the regional financial crisis and the inadequacies of the IMF's response to it, initially motivated a multitude of proposals for institutional reform at an international level. However, efforts towards the reform of the international financial architecture have “lost steam” following the sharp “V-shaped” recovery in East Asia. Moreover, a multilateral institution like the IMF is only likely to be reformed if there is a global crisis, and if there is a reasonable consensus about the lessons that may be learned from it. While the East Asian crisis did threaten to turn global, in actuality it did not. The domination of the Washington-based multilateral institutions by industrial countries seems to suggest that such reforms — to the IMF in particular or the international financial architecture more generally — are unlikely to occur any time soon (Eichengreen 2000). As such, the creation of a regional monetary facility may be an effective “do-it-yourself” (DIY) self-insurance mechanism for emerging economies in Asia against future crises (King 1999).

At the very least, serious discussion of the issue may help reinvigorate interests in strengthening the international financial architecture. Regional monetary facilities could complement the IMF in similar ways that regional development banks (such as the ADB) complement the World Bank's operations.¹⁷ The ADB has weighed in on the AMF proposal, and noted that:

(The) AMF could play a potentially important role as a complement to the IMF in providing funds to crisis-affected countries and developing an early warning system. The implementation of such regional institutions as the AMF as part of the newly emerging financial architecture will help both to enhance the efficiency of global financial markets and to minimize systematic risk. (ADB 1999, p. 44).

Radelet and Sachs (1998*b*) have suggested that the “arrival of the IMF gives all the confidence of

seeing an ambulance outside one's door". If so, from a "credibility" perspective, there would seem to be a need for the IMF to work in tandem with strong regional bodies during future crises if and when they occur. This is particularly so, given that restoration of "market confidence" has been among the stated goals of IMF conditionality in Asia.¹⁸ Unlike other regions, resource constraints are not as much of an issue in Asia (Dieter 2000). In addition, as noted, where the IMF has been able to orchestrate large financial packages of financial support, these have drawn largely on non-IMF money and have relied on contributions from other sources which have a specific regional interest. Moreover, as noted, it is not simply a question of the *quantity* of aggregate financial flows, but also a question of their *quality*. Financing that is available more rapidly and that comes with conditions that are generally perceived as appropriate, will be worth more to their recipients than flows that, while equivalent in volume, come after a delay and are surrounded by uncertainty (such as the IMF's support which was phased and conditional rather than disbursed upfront). As the ADB noted:

(o)nce a problem has been identified in a country, the government of that country needs to address it speedily. Given the damage that contagion can produce, regional peer pressure through the AMF could be an effective method of ensuring that this is done. Given its informational advantage and regional location, an AMF would likely be more receptive — hence geared to early action — to a regional crisis than a global institution. The resources the IMF initially made available were insufficient to head off the Asian crisis and additional packages had to be hastily assembled as the crisis unfolded. The AMF could provide such a line of defense on a permanent basis. (ADB 1999, p. 44).

2. Regional Contagion

The preceding discussion has alluded to the issue of "contagion". This term broadly refers to the simultaneous occurrence of currency crises in two or more economies. It may be more formally defined as a situation where a currency crisis in one economy leads to a jump to a "bad"

equilibrium in a neighbouring economy (Masson 1998).¹⁹ While there is a need to be very precise in defining the term "currency crisis" in empirical analyses, we take it here to broadly involve an actual break of an exchange rate peg and concomitant currency depreciation, or speculative pressure which may not lead to an exchange rate depreciation, but does lead to an international reserve depletion or an interest rate hike.

The currency crises of the 1990s highlight the importance of contagion or negative spillover effects that are largely *regional* in scope (consequently they are also referred to as "neighbourhood effects"). We restate that while the East Asian crisis did threaten to turn global, it did not. Similarly, while the currencies of Thailand, Hong Kong, and the Philippines underwent brief periods of speculative attacks during the Tequila crisis, the crisis predominantly affected Mexico's neighbouring economies (such as Argentina). In a recent study using a sample of twenty countries covering the periods of the 1982 Mexican debt crisis, the 1994–95 Tequila crisis and the 1997–98 Asian crisis, De Gregario and Valdes (1999) found contagion to be directly dependent on *geographical horizon*. Using a panel of annual data for nineteen developing economies for the period 1977–93, Krueger et al. (1998) concluded that a currency crisis in a *regional economy* raises the probability of a speculative attack on the domestic currency by about 8.5 percentage points.²⁰

A high-profile Independent Task Force on the Future of the International Financial Architecture sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (1999) recently recognized the existence of contagion and the need for some sort of facility to deal with the problem. According to them, such a facility should work in association with the IMF but not actually be part of the IMF's lending facility. They further argued that only countries affected by "systematic crises" or episodes of contagion ought to be provided the funding, which should be disbursed quickly and be heavily front-loaded. Advocates of monetary regionalism emphasize "contagion" effects as providing the analytical basis for some broader form of

economic co-operation regionally. The next section reviews the channels via which the currency crises are transmitted regionally and the policy implications thereof.

IV. The Economics of Contagion

In the case of Asia, while the crisis spread initially from Thailand (following the devaluation of the baht on 2 July 1997) to Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines by the end of August that year, the South Korean won depreciated in November. In turn, this had reverberations back to the rest of Southeast Asia. Singapore and Taiwan also experienced “modest” currency depreciations during September–October 1997, while Hong Kong’s currency board came under severe pressures, resulting in a sharp interest rate hike to maintain the currency peg.²¹ What are the channels which cause the contagious spread of crises? Five possible modes of transmission may be deciphered.

1. Transmission Channels

The first, and most direct, is the need to remain “cost competitive” *vis-à-vis* other economies with similar areas of comparative advantage, as a real devaluation in one economy enhances its export competitiveness at the expense of a trading partner (regional competitor). Gerlach and Smets (1995), Huh and Kasa (1997), and Corsetti et al. (1999) formalized the logic of this attack-induced competitive devaluation (i.e. regional economies’ competitiveness *vis-à-vis* third markets as a result of currency depreciations).²²

Second, in contrast to contagion due to the “competition” noted above, there may be extensive and growing trade, investment and other intraregional interdependencies, leading to contagion due to economic “complementarities” (including price and income effects due to a currency devaluation and recession in a neighbouring, importing economy). Hence, for instance, it is commonly noted that Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) has developed an intricate division of labour based on both

horizontal and vertical differentiation in East Asia.²³ This in turn has stimulated intraregional trade, with intra-East Asian trade constituting roughly half of the respective regions’ total trade (based on IMF data).

Third, losses in one economy may lead open-end mutual funds or banks to liquidate positions in other regional economies in which they have exposures. This so-called “forced portfolio adjustment/rebalance” behaviour may occur for a number of reasons. These include: an anticipation of increased redemptions; the need to cover losses in other crisis-hit markets (“cash-in” effects), and in order to reduce portfolio risks and improve the liquidity position (“flight to safety” effects).²⁴ Of particular significance is the contagious transmission of crises through the interbank lending channel (Eichengreen 1999; Van Rijckeghem and Weder 1999).²⁵

Fourth, many extra-regional investors, such as mutual funds and even foreign banks, tend to lump economies in the non-industrialized world into subregions, rather than make country-specific evaluations and investments.²⁶ Insofar as the entire geographical region is looked upon as a single investment class (i.e. “risk clusters”) rather than as individual markets, a weakness or attack on one currency could lead to a reassessment of the region’s “fundamentals” and the probability of a similar fate befalling regional economies with broadly similar macroeconomic stances (whether *actual* or *perceived*). This is popularly termed the “wake-up call” effect.

This phenomenon could also refer to the sudden realization of how little market participants truly understood about the regional economies, leading to a region-wide downgrading/sell-off (Radelet and Sachs 1998a). Drazen (1998) has developed a contagion model based on economies being in an implicit or explicit currency/monetary union. Thus, devaluation by one economy acts as a wake-up call to investors in the sense that it leads them to question the commitment of other regional economies to maintain “club membership” by not devaluing. Dooley (2000) has suggested that the “bunching together” of crises may be due to revisions in the effective size of official lines of

credit available to the regional governments to defend the currency (either from international agencies or *ad hoc* bilateral, multilateral agreements). The important point here is that unlike the mechanistic portfolio-rebalancing behaviour noted previously, in this case, actual linkages between the emerging markets do not necessarily have to exist (discussed further below).

Fifth, there is also the possibility of "panic herding" ("bandwagon" effects), either in the form of an international bank run ("race to the exits") leading to illiquidity *à la* Diamond and Dybvig (1983) or the Calvo (1999) capital-crisis model. The Calvo model may be best interpreted as an open economy extension of the models of information-friction that have been recently developed to explain herding behaviour in domestic financial markets.²⁷ Of importance is that fact that there are a wide variety of models and cases that could potentially lead to rational herding. In other words, one does not have to appeal to investor irrationality to motivate panic withdrawals, acute market volatility and busts.²⁸

An important agenda for empirical research in this field is to determine how relevant the various causes of contagion were in the case of the Asian crisis. In a recent study using a comprehensive data set of financial statistics, product information, geographic data, and stock returns involving 14,000 companies in forty-six economies, Forbes (1999) found that all the above transmission mechanisms were important in the case of the Asian crisis, particularly the product competitiveness channel.²⁹ *A priori*, it is surprising that the common creditor/credit crunch effect (through banks) was not found to be as important. However, this may be explained by the fact that Forbes focused on *international* rather than *regional* propagation and did not explicitly test for the herding channel. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000b) and Van Rijkeghem and Weder (1999) have concluded that the bank lender channel was particularly important in the Asian crisis, though the inclusion of a trade competition variable tends to dilute the significance, due possibly to the high correlation between competition for funds and trade. This is not

inconsistent with Glick and Rose (1999), who have suggested that trade is an important channel for regional contagion.

2. *Economic Fundamentals and Pure Contagion*

A distinction should be made between transmission channels that are related to investor sentiment or psychology (termed "pure contagion"), and linkages between countries that are measurable/observable *ex ante* (referred to as "spillovers" or "interrelatedness"). Masson (1998) showed how it is conceptually possible for "pure contagion" to make an economy relatively more susceptible to a currency crisis. To be sure, he noted that:

pure contagion is only possible if changes in expectations are self-fulfilling, and this requires that financial markets be subject to multiple equilibria...(and)...(e)ven if each country separately is not subject to multiple equilibria, together they may be, since the fear of crisis in one will increase the devaluation probability in the other, making a crisis more likely in both.

Shifts in market sentiments could lead to jumps between one equilibria and the other, consequently introducing sharp volatility in financial markets. Theoretically, anything could act as the coordinating device leading to a jump from a "good" to "bad" equilibria. For instance, a devaluation in one country could lead to a major downward spiralling of the currency and the domestic economy (given high interest rate policy and/or unhedged foreign currency liabilities of the country), or precipitate depreciations in regional countries.

Against this analytical background, it is revealing to note that, in almost all crises experiences, the economies initially and worst affected by the crises were also the ones with the worst fundamentals to begin with. On the other hand, even the strongest regional economies can be and have been affected by weaknesses in neighbouring economies because of trade and financial interdependencies.³⁰ Thus, the term contagion is quite apt, because, like a spreading virus, agents with the weakest immune system to

begin with are the ones most severely impacted. This point is nicely illustrated in the case of Asia using Table 2, borrowed from Goldstein and Hawkins (1998).

It is fairly clear that, by most counts, Thailand had the worst "fundamentals" (Rajan forthcoming). It was followed by Indonesia, which was the most severely impacted by the crisis.

TABLE 2
Summary of Economic Fundamentals of Selected Asian Economies

<i>Fundamentals</i>	<i>Country Rankings^a</i>						
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>
<u>External</u>							
International Reserves ^b	P	I	M	T	K	H	S
Current Account/GDP ^c	T	K	M	P	I	H	S
Debt/GDP ^d	T	P	I	M	S	H	S
Export Slowdown ^e	T	S	M	K	H	P	I
Real Exchange Rate: deviation from PPP ^f	S	K	H	M	T	I	P
<u>Banking Strength</u>							
Capital Adequacy ^g	K	T	I	M	P	H	S
Nonperforming Loans ^h	M	T	K	I	P	S	H
Bank Ratings ⁱ	I	K	T	P	H	M	S
<u>Liquidity Mismatches</u>							
Excess Credit Growth ^j	P	M	T	I	S	K	H
Short-term external debt/Reserves ^k	K	I	T	P	M	H	S
Broad Money/Reserves ^l	T	I	P	K	M	S	H
Overall Average ^m	T	I	K	P	M	S	H
Overall based on Thailand Weights ⁿ	T	I	K	P	M	S	H

NOTES:

^a I – Indonesia, H – Hong Kong, K – South Korea, M – Malaysia, P – Philippines, S – Singapore, T – Thailand. Ordinal ranking in descending order of "bad" fundamentals.

^b In SDRs, June 1997.

^c 1996.

^d 1997.

^e Change (%) in 1996 less the average change (%) previous three years.

^f June 1997.

^g Unclear from source, but probably average of 1996 and 1997.

^h 1997 estimates.

ⁱ May 1996.

^j Growth of credit to private sector relative to nominal GDP, 1996.

^k June 1997.

^l June 1997.

^m Equal weights to all fundamentals (including two others included in original sources).

ⁿ Greater weights given to fundamentals in which Thailand is weakest.

SOURCE: Goldstein and Hawkins (1998).

Hong Kong and Singapore, which seem to have had the best fundamentals, were the least affected (Rajan and Sen 2000). Malaysia and the Philippines were somewhere “in-between”.

The fact that stronger, though much more open and regionally integrated economies were much less affected, underscores the need for the primary focus to be placed squarely on the domestic policy arena. In the Asian context, this broadly involves strengthening the financial systems and corporate and industrial structures (Balino et al. 2000). However, given the fact that regional spillovers or interdependencies are fairly high and growing in Asia, even relatively strong regional economies can be and have been affected by crises in the weaker neighbouring economies. These policy externalities suggest the need for some form of regional co-operation in the financial and macroeconomic spheres. The emphasis on sound domestic economic policies and a regional approach to crisis prevention is fully consistent with the spirit of “subsidiarity” which is being increasingly emphasised by the IMF (also see Manzano 2001).

Some might argue that *pure contagion* will be far less important in the future, as investors seem to have differentiated between the regional economies following the crisis (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 1999). This view is debatable. In any case, indications are that countries in the region will be more susceptible to the fundamentals of the neighboring ones, as the stronger economies like Singapore have sharply escalated their investments in the crisis-hit economies such as Thailand, where asset prices remain depreciated.³¹ In other words, regional interdependencies can be expected to rise significantly in the future, suggesting the need for a regional monetary facility more than ever.

V. Concluding Remarks

The East Asian economies have, since the 1990s, taken small but important steps towards enhanced monetary regionalism as a means of promoting regional economic stability in an age of global capital markets. The creation of the EMEAP

(Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks), the introduction of a web of bilateral swap and repurchase arrangements, recently expanded to a regional East Asian level to include ASEAN plus China, Japan, and Korea (the “Chiang Mai Initiative”), the Manila Framework, and the ASEAN–ADB surveillance mechanism, are all steps in the right direction.³² The creation of a regional monetary facility would be a natural evolution of this process and a recognition of the region’s commonality of interests. The time seems ripe to take the next step and explore the modalities and detailed mechanisms necessary to make such a facility operational, but always keeping in mind the region’s commitment to “open regionalism” (particularly with regard to membership).³³ There are pre-existing channels and organizations in Asia and elsewhere which promote regional economic co-operation in international trade and related spheres, with a regional monetary facility being a “natural” intensification of such efforts. As in the case of trading arrangements in Asia, monetary regionalism can be designed to complement and be consistent with existing multilateral arrangements.

Even if one is convinced about the potential benefits of monetary regionalism, there nevertheless remain a number of outstanding questions that need to be sorted out with regard to a regional facility like the AMF (Bird and Rajan 2000). An immediate concern is invariably one of how such a regional facility would co-exist with the IMF. Would their roles be *complementary* or *competitive*? Some analysts have argued for the need to break the “monopoly” of the IMF in the realm of *conditionality* and *crisis management*. Others have gone on to argue that a regional facility may be able to design “better” or “more appropriate” conditionality than the IMF, because of the former’s supposed superior regional knowledge and its closer geographical proximity to its member countries (ADB 1999).

Indeed, opinions on these issues vary even among ASEAN members. For instance, when asked about the AMF, Singapore’s Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew felt that, for AMF to be effective, “it has to play a subsidiary role, subsidiary to the main fund”.³⁴ He noted that no Asian group of

governments is able to tell another that they will not be supported if they do not comply with certain standards, suggesting the need for an external body such as the IMF to ensure enforcement. On the other hand, the President of the Thailand Development Research Institute, Chalongphob Sussangkarn was of the view that if the AMF were to replicate IMF albeit regionally, then there would be no need for it. Instead, the regional agency should, according to him, be defined mainly in relation to the promotion of monetary co-operation

and regional financial and capital market developments (Chalongphob 2000).

Space limitations preclude a detailed and systematic discussion of these issues. Suffice to note that, while any suggestion that a regional monetary facility would have a comparative advantage in diagnosing regional economic problems is debatable, a regional monetary facility might be better able than the IMF to reach a genuine consensus on policy reform to ensure greater ownership of a programme of reform.

NOTES

This article draws on earlier works by the authors (see Bird and Rajan 1999, Chang and Rajan 1999 and Rajan 2000, 2001). Comments on an earlier draft by two anonymous referees are duly acknowledged. The usual disclaimer regarding errors and omissions applies.

1. Japan's financial aid packages to the region may be seen in similar light (Chang and Rajan 1999).
2. Cited in Hamada (1998).
3. Also see Hamada (1998). Eisuke Sakakibara ("Mr Yen") detailed the formulation of the AMF proposal in his memoirs, where he chronicled the opposition he faced from the U.S. administration (Kojima 2000).
4. However, China did continue to participate in the ensuing discussions and were more supportive of the reformulated regional monetary mechanism (Kirton 1999).
5. See the WEF Press Release (19 October 1999).
6. See the "Welcome Remarks" of the chairman of the third ASEAN Informal Summit at the Summit Opening Ceremonies, Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (November 1999). Available at <<http://www.aseansec.org>>.
7. See "Japan's Goal in the 21st Century: The Report of the Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century" (January 2000). The Report explained Japan's challenges and policies from the medium- to long-term as it moves into the next century. Available at <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/21century/report/htmls/7chap6.html>>.
8. Rose (1999) is an exception.
9. Information on the EMEAP is available at <<http://www.emeap.org:8084/>>.
10. See the APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration, "Strengthening the Foundations for Growth", 18 November, 1998.
11. See "The Chiang Mai Initiative", a Discussion Paper for the Special ASEAN Finance Deputies Meeting (AFDM) + 3 (6 May 2000). Available at: <<http://www.mfa.go.th/dea/chiangmai%20initiative.htm>>.
12. See *Bangkok Post*, 9 May 2000, *The Straits Times* (Singapore) 30 December 2000, and McNulty (2000).
13. The criticism is primarily aimed at the size of the funds available in the scheme. As reported by Bello (2000), Sakakibara is of the view that without funds ranging from US\$20 to US\$40 billion, the arrangements would not make a difference. Others have suggested that the ideal credit line is more in the range of US\$50 to US\$100 billion (*The Straits Times* (Singapore) 30 December 2000). Private bankers have indicated that the swap-and-repurchase arrangements were "outdated, stop-gap" measures (Crompton 2000).
14. See <<http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2000/tr000920.htm>> for the transcript of the press conference. Sources close to Kohler have reported that he believes that opposition towards the original AMF scheme was "mistaken" (Rowley 2000). Bello (2000) has, however, observed that:

(t)he studious avoidance of the word "Fund" by Japanese officials underlines the fact that Japan and the Asian countries continue to be prevented from making really bold steps by the desire not to ignite the open opposition of the United States.
15. Other members of the G-20 forum are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey; the G-7 group of industrialized economies are Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States. The European Union (EU) and IMF are also participants.

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16. In order to minimize the possibility of such bias, Eichengreen (2000) argued for giving the IMF's executive directors more independence from governments by amending the Article of Agreement. He recognized the possibility that, as long as the IMF was dependent on financial supplementation from national governments for assistance programs to crisis-hit economies, such independence would be illusory. This seems to provide additional rationale for a well-funded regional facility.
 17. Of course, the flip side of this would be that the ADB and other regional development banks are largely redundant and ought themselves to be shut down, leaving only international institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as part of the new financial architecture (Dornbusch 1999).
 18. Krugman (1998), Mussa (1999), and Rodrik (1999) provided general and interesting discussions of the issue of market confidence and the IMF-mandated reform programmes in crisis-hit economies. See Mukand (1999) for a pioneering attempt at providing the analytical underpinnings of these issues.
 19. Some have referred to a contagion as an increase in asset price volatility across countries.
 20. Other recent empirical studies confirming this regional dimension of currency crises include Calvo and Reinhart (1996), Frankel and Schmukler (1996), Glick and Rose (1999), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000a).
 21. Empirical work by Park and Song (1999) suggested that contagion spread from Taiwan (following the pre-emptive devaluation of the New Taiwan dollar in October) to Hong Kong and South Korea, which then reverberated back to Southeast Asia.
 22. The broad similarity of comparative advantages of the Asian economies has been shown to hold, at least *ex post* (as measured by the index of revealed comparative advantage) (Kellman and Chow 1993).
 23. Ng and Yeats (1999) provided new statistics detailing the extent of such intraregional production and trade in component manufacturing parts in Asia. Intraregional investment has also been spurred by Singapore's drive in recent years to build the external dimension of its economy to complement and supplement the domestic economy.
 24. See Calvo (1999) for a model involving two sets of agents (informed and uninformed), in which margin calls necessitate asset sales in one economy following price declines in another. Folkerts-Landau and Garber (1998) stressed risk control systems as a possible reason for region-wide asset sell-offs and resultant contagion; while Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) emphasized the value at risk (VAR) technique in particular. However, Schinasi and Smith (1999) showed such financial contagion could result from normal/textbook portfolio diversification rules, with risk management techniques and rules not having any significantly different consequences on optimal sell-off periods/strategies. Baig and Goldfajn (1998) tested for evidence of contagion in the exchange rates, interest rates, equity, and sovereign debt markets of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, and the Philippines. They found that while sovereign spreads showed clear evidence of contagion (of the weak form), the same could not be said of the regional equity markets.
 25. This may also be referred to as the "credit crunch" or "liquidity" channel, as it entails a general reduction in the availability of funds.
 26. In other words, there are region-specific or dedicated funds such as the Asia Pacific Fund, the Asian Tigers Fund and others. See Frankel and Schlumker (1996) for a list of such Asia-devoted funds.
 27. See, for instance, Banerjee (1992) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990). See Chang and Velasco (1998, 1999) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) for open economy extensions of the Diamond-Dybvig framework of pay-off externalities.
 28. In a key paper, Pritsker (1999) has underscored that investor's behavior *per se*, regardless of whether they are rational or irrational, could cause financial contagion across countries.
 29. Liu et al. (1998) also provided empirical support for this product competitiveness channel in the case of the Southeast Asian economies.
 30. Similarly, in the case of the Tequila crisis, Chile, which was acknowledged to be by far the strongest regional economy in Latin America, was relatively unaffected.
 31. Thus, figures from the Thai central bank show Singapore's direct investment in Thailand to have jumped to 31.7 billion baht in 1998, up from 9.9 billion baht in 1997, making Singapore the third largest investor in the country after the United States and Japan (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 October 1999, p. 68).
 32. Manzano (2001) and Rajan (2001) have discussed the ASEAN-ADB surveillance initiative in some detail.
 33. For instance, while initial membership presumably would involve the APT economies, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, India (which is a member of G-20) are some of the possible future entrants.
 34. See transcript of discussion at <<http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/FR/NIKKEI/inasia/future/2000discussion.html>>.

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